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d e a r  a l u m n i  a n d  f r i e n d s ,
ast fall I had the opportunity to teach the professional seminar course for the first time. The 
course, which is designed to help students integrate religious and moral values into their 
service as attorneys, has a venerable tradition at the Law School and is one of the distinctive 
parts of our curriculum. It is always a joy to be in the classroom, but I particularly appreci-
ated the chance to read and ponder articles—many from past issues of the Clark 
Memorandum—about the roles and core obligations of lawyers in society. Although 
we often fall short of our noblest aspirations, I found myself energized by the reminder of the fixed 
stars that should serve as our professional compass.
 As most will remember, medieval and early modern tradition recognized only three true “professions”: law, clergy, and medicine. 
These days it seems as though every job is labeled a profession, partly, I imagine, because of the historical connotation of privilege 
and authority associated with the “professional” label. At the same time, the understanding of law as one of the original noble pro-
fessions seems to be dissipating. To fight the former would seem to be a misplaced focus on retaining a privileged position in the 
hierarchy of job categories. But we should not give in to the latter trend of allowing law to drift from its noble professional moorings. 
 Various explanations have been offered for why law, clergy, and medicine were separated out and labeled “professions.” 
Partly, it was the idea that they were held to a specific code of ethics and required some form of oath to uphold that code, thereby 
“professing” to a higher standard of accountability. The expectation was that professionals would use their privileged position 
and specialized knowledge for all who required it and not simply for personal advantage.
 Another key attribute of these original three professions was that each enjoyed the privilege and obligation of confidential-
ity. Elder Bruce C. Hafen once explained why: “They are all healers—those to whom we open up our innermost secrets when 
something seems to threaten our very lives, physically, spiritually, or in some other way that would destroy our liberty or our 
property—our chance to live. And we go to them to be healed—to be made whole, and to regain control over our lives.”1
 At one of our graduations, Utah Supreme Court Chief Justice Matthew B. 
Durrant made a similar point: “Often the fact that a person comes to a lawyer 
means that something has gone terribly wrong in that person’s life. People come 
to lawyers with broken marriages, broken partnerships, broken bodies, broken 
lives. They come when they have been done an injustice or stand accused of one. 
They come when their fortune, or even their freedom, is at risk. In short, people 
will come to you with a problem, often at a time in their lives when they are most 
vulnerable. It is how you see that problem that will define you as a lawyer. Do 
you see in it the potential for your own profit, or do you see in it an opportunity to serve?”2
 As I considered, along with my professional seminar students, the articles by Chief Justice Durrant, Elder Hafen, and others, 
I was grateful for the reminder that we are not only a learned profession but a healing profession.
 That tradition is evident in the pages of this issue of the Clark Memorandum, where you can read about David and Chelom 
Leavitt’s efforts to promote a stable and ethical legal system in Ukraine, Moldova, and Rwanda, as well as Elder D. Todd Christof-
ferson’s charge to “live your faith so that others—inside and outside the legal community—will see your good works, experience 
your genuine love and friendship, and feel the Spirit working through you.”
 I hope you enjoy this issue of the Clark Memorandum and that you’ll drop by and visit us at the Law School if you are in Provo. 
I’d love to give you the nickel tour of our building renovations, introduce you to some of my extraordinary new colleagues, and 
find a way to involve you in our efforts to prepare students for a learned and healing profession.
                              Warm regards,
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1  Bruce C. Hafen, “To Beginning Law Students on  
Professionalism” (unpublished manuscript, 1973).
2  Matthew B. Durrant, “The Lawyer as Peacemaker,”  
Clark Memorandum, Fall 2008, 12–13.
4 c l a r k  m e m o r a n d u m
 
w a t c h m e n    o n  t h e  t o w e r   Religious Freedom in a Secular Age
w a t c h m e n    o n  t h e  t o w e r   Religious Freedom in a Secular Age
Elder D. Todd Christofferson
Of the Quorum of the Twelve Apostles
It is a pleasure for Kathy and me to be 
here in this stunningly beautiful place 
among friends and fellow lawyers. 
(Those aren’t always the same thing, by 
the way.) I honor the ideals of this great 
society, and I commend you for gather-
ing to discuss important issues that 
affect people and institutions of faith.
 The mission statement of the 
J. Reuben Clark Law Society “affirm[s] 
the strength brought to the law by a 
lawyer’s personal religious conviction” 
and calls on its members to “strive 
through public service and profes-
sional excellence to promote fairness 
and virtue founded upon the rule of 
law.”1 At no time has that mission been 
more important. So thank you for the 
invitation to speak here today and for 
your support of this important society.
i l l u s t r a t i o n s  b y  a l e x  n a b a u m
 c l a r k  m e m o r a n d u m
Background and Basic Principles
I especially appreciate the opportunity to share a few thoughts about freedom of religion. 
As a Church and as individual Church members, we face difficult challenges to our funda-
mental right to live according to the dictates of our faith. Our basic understanding of moral-
ity, marriage, family, and the purpose of life is becoming foreign to the secular cultures in 
which we live. As President Thomas S. Monson has noted, “Where once the standards of 
the Church and the standards of society were mostly compatible, now there is a wide chasm 
between us, and it’s growing ever wider.”2 Values we once shared with the great majority of 
our fellow citizens are now often considered outdated, naïve, and sometimes even bigoted. 
Because a society’s deepest values drive law and public policy, and because those values in 
many Western nations are now almost entirely secular, government is increasingly enforcing 
secular values at the expense of religious ones. And society itself—even without the force of 
government—can ostracize, stigmatize, and discriminate against religious believers in overt 
and subtle ways, leaving people of faith marginalized and sometimes even despised. As this 
happens—and it is happening more rapidly in some countries than others—the space for us to 
freely and openly live out our deepest beliefs will tend to shrink and our ability to participate 
in civic life as free and equal citizens will tend to diminish. We indeed face challenging times.
 Of course, the Church has always faced challenging times and thus has always been con-
cerned about religious freedom. In the early years the Church and its members faced severe 
persecution, both official and unofficial—and it was often violent. That persecution drove the 
Saints from New York to Ohio, Missouri, and Illinois. Yet even in Nauvoo, where the Saints 
had their own city and a large militia to protect them, official and unofficial persecutions con-
tinued. The Saints eventually had no choice but to leave the United States, settling in the 
desert of present-day Utah, then a part of Mexico. Many died as a result of those persecutions, 
including the Prophet Joseph Smith and his 
brother Hyrum, and many more were abused, 
beaten, and stripped of their property. And, 
as you know, the persecutions didn’t end 
when the Saints settled in Utah. As govern-
ment harassment found its way there too, 
some Saints migrated north to Canada, seek-
ing peace, security, and freedom. So the his-
tory of the Church in Canada has important 
links to the quest for religious freedom.3 
 The Church’s commitment to freedom 
of religion is rooted in its most basic doc-
trines. The 11th Article of Faith declares: “We 
claim the privilege of worshiping Almighty 
God according to the dictates of our own 
conscience, and allow all men the same privi-
lege, let them worship how, where, or what they may.”4 The path of discipleship and exaltation 
is one of faith-filled obedience and humble service—of willingly giving our lives to the Lord. 
But faith cannot be forced, and so moral agency is essential to the plan of salvation.
 Thus, at a time when religious differences were often the cause of intolerance and vio-
lence, the Prophet Joseph Smith proclaimed toleration and equal rights for all faiths. He said:
 The Saints can testify whether I am willing to lay down my life for my brethren. If it has been 
demonstrated that I have been willing to die for a “Mormon,” I am bold to declare before Heaven 
that I am just as ready to die in defending the rights of a Presbyterian, a Baptist, or a good man of 
any other denomination; for the same principle which would trample upon the rights of the Latter-
day Saints would trample upon the rights of the Roman Catholics, or of any other denomination 
who may be unpopular and too weak to defend themselves. 
 It is a love of liberty which inspires my soul—civil and religious liberty to the whole of the 
human race.5
Notice the Prophet’s concern about the rights of vulnerable, minority religions that lack 
sufficient popular support “to defend themselves.” That has always been a core issue when 
addressing freedom of religion.
 More recently, Elder Dallin H. Oaks has emphasized the importance of religious believ-
ers of all faiths standing up for religious freedom:
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[I]t is imperative that those of us who believe in 
God and in the reality of right and wrong unite 
more effectively to protect our religious freedom 
to preach and practice our faith in God and the 
principles of right and wrong He has established. 
 . . . All that is necessary for unity and a 
broad coalition along the lines I am suggesting is 
a common belief that there is a right and wrong 
in human behavior that has been established by 
a Supreme Being. All who believe in that funda-
mental [principle] should unite more effectively 
to preserve and strengthen the freedom to advo-
cate and practice our religious beliefs, whatever 
they are. We must walk together for a ways on 
the same path in order to secure our freedom to 
pursue our separate ways when that is necessary 
according to our own beliefs.6
 That task will be difficult and will require 
constant vigilance, but it is of vital impor-
tance. As Elder Quentin L. Cook has said: 
Extraordinary effort will be required to protect 
religious liberty. Our doctrine confirms what 
the U.S. founding fathers and political philoso-
phers have advocated. 
 “No government can exist in peace, except 
such laws are framed and held inviolate as will 
secure to each individual the free exercise of 
conscience” (d&c 134:2).7
 As you review these and other state-
ments by modern apostles, notice that the 
freedom being spoken of is not merely what 
political philosophers have referred to as the 
“negative” freedom to be left alone, however 
important that may be. Rather, they speak of 
a much richer “positive” freedom—the free-
dom to live one’s religion in a legal, politi-
cal, and social environment that is tolerant, 
respectful, and accommodating of religion. 
For the faithful, religion is not just a private 
hobby but a way of life bound up with one’s 
personal identity and dignity. 
 Naturally, virtually everyone in the West-
ern democracies claims to believe in the prin-
ciple of religious freedom. It is the application 
of the principle that creates controversy. 
Threats to religious freedom typically arise 
when religious people and institutions seek 
to say or do something—or refuse to say or 
do something—that runs counter to the phi-
losophy or goals of those in power, includ-
ing political majorities. As the experience of 
apostles and prophets, ancient and modern, invariably demonstrates, religion is often counter-
cultural and thus unpopular. Likewise, religious freedom, while generally supported in principle, 
is often vigorously opposed in practice.
 I was in Houston the day before yesterday. An article in the paper that morning reported 
on subpoenas being issued by the city government to a number of pastors, from Southern 
Baptist to nondenominational clerics, to turn over copies of any sermons and pastoral com-
munications dealing with homosexuality, gender identity, or Annise Parker, the city’s openly 
lesbian mayor. The Houston Chronicle reported that opponents of Houston’s new antidis-
crimination ordinance had filed a lawsuit, and the city’s attorneys had responded by issuing 
the subpoenas to pastors. The pastors are not part of the lawsuit, but they have opposed the 
ordinance. One pastor responded, “This is an attempt to chill pastors from speaking to the 
cultural issues of the day. The mayor would like to silence our voice.”8
 So how are principles of religious freedom to be advocated in Canada, the United States, 
and in other places around the world? In secular societies that prize secular values more than 
religious truths and that increasingly see religion as an impediment to social progress, those 
who support religious freedom must carefully distinguish between what is vital and what is 
less critical. Think about these difficult questions:
1 What protections are essential so that Church members and families can have sufficient 
freedom to live the gospel and pass on their faith to their children?
2 What protections are central to the ability of the Church to carry out its divine mission 
to preach the gospel of Jesus Christ, administer the ordinances of salvation to the living and 
the dead, and strengthen home and family?
3 How and when should the Church get involved in social and moral issues that affect 
religious freedom?
 Some answers to these questions remain constant. For example, the Church must be 
able to select its own priesthood leaders without any outside interference. But with some 
questions, answers will turn on the diverse situations the Church faces in different countries 
around the world. 
Recent Church Experience in Canada—The Same-Sex Marriage “Reference” Case
The Canadian same-sex marriage case provides a useful example of the pragmatic approach 
the Church must sometimes take in matters of religious freedom. As you know, the Church 
has been very clear in its teachings and public statements about the Lord’s pattern of mar-
riage. “The Family: A Proclamation to the World” states “that marriage between a man and 
a woman is ordained of God” and “is essential to His eternal plan.”9 Marriage and family are 
                     RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, 
WHILE GENERALLY SUPPORTED 
                          IN PRINCIPLE , IS OFTEN 
            V IGOROUSLY OPPOSED 
                                      IN PRACTICE . 
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 central “to the Creator’s plan for the eternal destiny of His children.”10 The proclamation 
calls on Church members and people of goodwill to raise their voices in support of the Lord’s 
pattern of marriage because it is best for children, families, and society.
 Accordingly, in the United States and other nations, often in concert with other religious 
groups, the Church has exercised its right to express its view that public policy should retain 
and support the traditional husband-wife definition of marriage. 
 But same-sex marriage also presents serious religious freedom challenges for Latter-day 
Saints and other believers. These challenges are often not well understood, even by faithful 
Church members. Without going into great detail, suffice it to say that a legal system and 
a society that define and protect marriage as the union of two people regardless of gender 
will tend to be more hostile toward—and less tolerant of—religious institutions and people 
of faith who teach that God has ordained marriage to be the union of husband and wife. A 
government and a society committed to the “genderless” marriage model will tend to sup-
press traditional marriage beliefs and practices as invidiously discriminatory.
 Thus the Church’s opposition to same-sex marriage entails both deep concern for the 
welfare of children and families and concern for the freedom of the Church and its members 
to teach and live the gospel of Jesus Christ.
 Nevertheless, the Church is keenly aware of political and social realities. In the public 
realm, the Church must make difficult, pragmatic decisions about how and when it expresses 
its views on marriage and which public policies it advocates or opposes, even as it upholds 
and defends the purity of its doctrine.
 This brings us to the Canadian same-sex marriage case. As many of you may know, by 
2003 several provincial courts had interpreted the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms to grant same-sex couples the right to marry on equal terms with husband-wife cou-
ples. Rather than resist this trend in the Supreme Court of Canada, the federal government 
decided to redefine marriage to include same-sex couples. Politically, there appeared to be 
little or no chance that the government would change its mind or that a majority of Parlia-
ment would reject the government’s proposal.
 Parliament nevertheless sought Supreme Court clarification on several important points. 
Through the established “reference” procedure, the government referred four questions to 
the Supreme Court:
 The first two asked whether the Parliament of Canada had the authority to determine 
legal capacity for marriage and, if so, whether its proposed Act was consistent with the Cana-
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
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 The third asked whether “the freedom 
of religion guaranteed by paragraph 2(a) 
of the Canadian Charter protects religious 
officials from being compelled to perform a 
marriage between two persons of the same 
sex that is contrary to their religious beliefs.”
 The fourth asked whether the traditional 
opposite-sex definition of marriage is con-
sistent with the Charter.11
 Through an admirably open process, 
diverse groups from across Canada were 
allowed to submit legal arguments to the 
Supreme Court. The Church could have cho-
sen to argue against same-sex marriage itself, 
as it has done in other contexts. It could also 
have lent its support to other groups opposing 
the same-sex marriage legislation in Parlia-
ment. But because it was apparent that Par-
liament was headed that way regardless of 
contrary views, the Church instead chose to 
focus on the religious freedom issue, where it 
believed it could have the most influence.
 Working through our legal counsel at 
Kirton McConkie in Salt Lake City, the 
Church selected superb local counsel with 
experience in advocating before Canada’s 
appellate courts. One of those lawyers, Peter 
Lauwers, now serves as a justice on the 
Court of Appeal for Ontario.
 The Church’s legal teams sought to 
broaden the issue beyond the narrow right 
of religious officials to refuse to solem-
nize same-sex marriages, as important as 
that is, to include the institutional rights 
of churches themselves. They crafted an 
argument for the Church’s factum (or brief ) 
urging the Court to recognize that churches 
need autonomy to govern their internal 
affairs, select their leaders, and control 
their sacred properties—even if that means 
not participating in, accommodating, or rec-
ognizing, for religious purposes, same-sex 
marriages and related celebrations. 
 The Church intervened in the case, and 
its legal counsel presented oral argument 
before the Supreme Court, which was well 
received by the Justices. The approach was 
successful. While technically not covered 
by the reference questions, at the Church’s 
urging the Supreme Court nevertheless reaf-
firmed its commitment to religious freedom 
not only for religious officials in the perfor-
mance of marriage rites but also for religious 
institutions in their ownership of sacred properties. In its decision, the Court made a number 
of critically important statements that shored up religious freedom in Canada:
1 First, the Court made a very important and broad statement affirming religious freedom 
generally. It said: “The right to freedom of religion enshrined in section 2(a) of the Charter 
encompasses the right to believe and entertain the religious beliefs of one’s choice, the right 
to declare one’s religious beliefs openly and the right to manifest religious belief by worship, 
teaching, dissemination and religious practice. The performance of religious rites is a fun-
damental aspect of religious practice.”12 
2 On the specific issue of clergy being forced to solemnize same-sex marriages, the Court 
stated: “It therefore seems clear that state compulsion on religious officials to perform same-
sex marriages contrary to their religious beliefs would violate the guarantee of freedom of 
religion under section 2(a) of the Charter.”13
3 The Court then went on to address religious property issues, which as a practical matter 
means property owned by religious institutions: “The question we are asked to answer is 
confined to the performance of same-sex marriages by religious officials. However, concerns 
were raised [and here the Court was referencing the Church’s legal argument] about the com-
pulsory use of sacred places for the celebration of such marriages and about being compelled 
to otherwise assist in the celebration of same-sex marriages. The reasoning that leads us to 
conclude that the guarantee of freedom of religion protects against the compulsory celebration of 
same-sex marriages suggests that the same would hold for these concerns.”14 
 Notice some of the important things the Court emphasized as falling within the protec-
tion of the Charter: (1) the right to believe and choose one’s religion; (2) the right to declare 
one’s religious beliefs openly; (3) the right not only to hold a belief but to “manifest” it “by 
worship, teaching, dissemination and religious practice”; (4) the right of religious officials to 
control the performance of religious ceremonies; and (5) the right not to have sacred proper-
ties used for the celebration of same-sex marriages—and, by implication, for any activities 
that are contrary to a religion’s doctrines and norms.
 These are significant acknowledgments of vital rights. The Church’s participation helped 
to shore up these critical legal protections for religious officials and churches. Religious 
freedom isn’t absolutely protected in Canada—or anywhere, for that matter—but what the 
Church helped secure from the Canadian Supreme Court was a strong wall of protection that 
so far has served the Church and its members in Canada well.
Protecting Religious Freedom Generally and the Role of JRCLS Members
The Church’s experience in the Canadian same-sex marriage case highlights the sort of 
principled, faithful pragmatism that must guide the Church in navigating difficult religious 
freedom issues in secular societies that are increasingly suspicious of religious viewpoints. 
It has required the Church to distinguish between the ideal and the essential.
 For example, as I asked earlier, what religious freedom protections are central to the abil-
ity of the Church to carry out its divine mission? Clearly the rights mentioned by the Canadian 
Supreme Court are essential. But that was by no means a comprehensive list. The following 
rights are also vital:
1 the right of the Church to define its own doctrine;
2 the right of the Church to select its own priesthood and other leaders based on its own 
policies and divine inspiration without any interference from government;
3 the right to determine who may and may not be a member of the Church and the privi-
leges and limitations of membership;
4 the right to own property and build Church meetinghouses and temples free from unrea-
sonable restrictions;
c l a r k  m e m o r a n d u m
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5 the right to peacefully gather for wor-
ship, activities, and socializing;
6 the right to receive and control sacred 
funds donated by Church members; 
7 the right to operate schools and universi-
ties on equal terms with other religious and 
secular groups; and 
8 the right not to be retaliated or discrim-
inated against by government—such as by 
the denial of tax-exempt status—because of 
the Church’s beliefs and teachings.
 This is by no means a comprehensive list 
either, but you can begin to see some of the 
areas in which conflicts might arise.
 And what about the rights of individual 
Church members? What protections are 
essential so that members and their fami-
lies can be free to live the gospel and pass 
on their faith to their children? That is not 
an easy question. Obviously the rights men-
tioned by the Canadian Supreme Court go 
a long way toward protecting individuals 
from outright oppression. But what about 
the ability to teach your children the gospel 
without having them or their beliefs directly 
targeted for ridicule or suppression? Should 
parents have the right to opt out of certain 
social or school programs that might teach 
their children concepts contrary to Church 
doctrine? 
 What about the right of Church mem-
bers to earn an honest living in profes-
sions like the law and social work without 
abandoning their beliefs about marriage 
and family? Should, for example, a Church 
member who openly believes in the 
Church’s teachings regarding marriage and 
the law of chastity be barred from being a 
social worker? Should a qualified lds attor-
ney who graduated from byu’s law school, 
which has an honor code that forbids sexual 
relations outside a husband-wife marriage, 
be precluded from practicing law in Canada? 
A growing number of voices would answer 
yes to both these questions.
 You may be aware of the travails of the 
prospective Trinity Western University 
School of Law in British Columbia. Trin-
ity Western University (twu) is a private 
religious school in Langley. Like byu, it 
has an honor code—or, as they call it, a 
“covenant”—that all students are required 
to sign. It includes a commitment to not 
engage in sexual relationships outside of heterosexual marriage. twu has approval to open 
a law school in 2016, but the board of governors of each provincial law society determines 
whether to recognize degrees from the law school. A number of provincial law societies 
have voted to do so, but we are now seeing increasing fire from activists who oppose twu 
because they consider the school’s covenant “discriminatory.” The board of governors in 
British Columbia recognized the law school earlier this year. The Church was one of the enti-
ties that filed a letter in support at the request of the sponsoring religious institution. Some 
provincial law society members, however, have challenged the board’s action, and now the 
matter will be put to a referendum this month.15
 Obviously, Church members should be legally protected, like all other religious groups, 
from discrimination in employment, housing, and places of public accommodation. But 
should members of the Church who own small businesses have the right to decline to facili-
tate same-sex marriages just as members of the clergy have the right not to solemnize them? 
Does it matter if there are plenty of other business owners willing to provide the same ser-
vices at a comparable price?
 These and many other related questions raise sensitive issues and can be very difficult 
to answer in the different contexts in which Church members live around the world. A prin-
cipled, faithful pragmatism must guide the Church when addressing such issues.
Therefore, What?
I come back to the J. Reuben Clark Law Society and what you as lds attorneys can do to help 
protect religious freedom. Again, without presuming to offer a comprehensive list, let me 
focus on three areas. 
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 First, it is important that you become informed about existing and potential threats to 
religious freedom. In the United States at least, and I suspect it is the same here, whenever 
any sort of construction project is proposed, environmental groups are quick to recognize 
any adverse environmental effects that the project may create. They have spent the time and 
effort needed to understand the issues so they can detect threats to the interests they care 
about. In like manner, we need lawyers who care enough about religious freedom and are 
well enough informed that they can recognize both existing threats and those that are likely 
to materialize in the future.
 To do that in a truly helpful way, you need to excel in your chosen field of practice, to 
maintain the highest professional and personal standards, and then to get involved in the 
important institutions and forums that pertain to your field. You need to be among the best 
and most respected in your area of the law. As you strive toward this goal, you will gain the 
expertise to detect religious freedom threats in specific areas of the law and public policy. 
You will have the respect of your professional colleagues, so they will listen to you as you 
raise concerns. And in some instances you will be in a position—perhaps even within govern-
ment—from which you can directly propose and help enact positive solutions.
 So pursue excellence in your chosen area of practice; be attorneys of the highest integrity; 
earn the personal and professional respect of your legal peers; get involved where it matters 
in your field; and be, as it were, “watchmen on the tower” of religious freedom. 
 Second, we need you to keep the Church informed of risks and concerns—and then to 
be patient. The Church needs to know, based on your expertise and position, about threats 
to religious freedom. It needs to know about gathering storms. We need appropriate and 
orderly mechanisms so the Church can be better informed of potential threats to religious 
liberty, and those mechanisms are something we will be developing in the months ahead.
 But we also need you to understand that, just as with the Canadian same-sex marriage 
case, the Church must make prudential decisions based on what can realistically be accom-
plished given the Church’s resources, vulnerabilities, and other goals. That may mean that 
the concerns you raise do not result in the Church’s taking action. (If it is of any comfort, you 
should know that not all of my opinions and recommendations are heeded either.) But it will 
also mean that when the Church decides to act, you will be ready to assist in the best way 
possible.
 Finally, and more broadly, the Church and society need you to be examples of the believ-
ers, in word and deed. Elder Cook has said, “One of the reasons the attack on moral and 
religious principles has been so successful is the reluctance of people of faith to express their 
views.”16 We need you to speak up—to express your views and defend the faith. And we need 
you to do so with respect for the beliefs of others and with dignity and decency as disciples 
of Jesus Christ.
 And, just as important, you must live your faith so that others—inside and outside the 
legal community—will see your good works, experience your genuine love and friendship, 
and feel the Spirit working through you. Because as they do, they will want to listen to you 
and understand when you say your religious freedom is being abridged. They may not agree 
with you or even understand entirely the issue that is so important to you. But if they know 
you and respect you because you are a true disciple of Christ, they will be far more inclined 
to work toward a solution that respects the religious freedoms of both you and the Church.
Conclusion
Brothers and sisters—fellow attorneys—ours is a noble profession. At its highest, the legal 
profession defends the vulnerable, secures God-given rights, promotes justice and order, 
mitigates and often avoids conflict, and brings peace. May we strive for excellence in all we 
do so we will be ready when the Lord calls us to defend the cause of righteousness and free-
dom. May we stand as watchmen on the tower, ever vigilant against forces that would harm 
essential liberties. May we build bridges to all around us by living as true disciples. And may 
we, as advocates and mediators, strive in all things to emulate Jesus Christ, our Advocate 
and Mediator with the Father. In the name of Jesus Christ, amen.
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I was a student at Georgetown University, 
as one of two Latter-day Saint, or Mor-
mon, undergraduates, I was invited to say the prayer at a university 
event honoring a Mormon businessman, Bill Marriott. I remember 
worrying acutely about how I should close my prayer. I was at a Catho-
lic university—should I pray according to Catholic conventions? What 
would Bill Marriott think if I, the handpicked Mormon student, was not 
praying in a Mormon fashion? Finally I asked Father Timothy S. Healy, 
SJ, who was the president of the university and from whom I was taking 
a poetry class. Father Healy told me to pray in the usual Mormon way, 
which is to end a prayer by saying, “In the name of Jesus Christ, amen.”
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 Years later I was at a luncheon hosted 
by leaders of The Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints as part of one of our annual 
International Law and Religion Symposium 
at byu Law School. Elder Henry B. Eyring, 
first counselor in the First Presidency of the 
Church, was speaking to a group of profes-
sors, religious leaders, and government offi-
cials from approximately 40 countries and a 
variety of religious traditions.
 At the end of his remarks he left a bless-
ing, and his choice of words made an impres-
sion on me. He said, “Let me conclude in 
my way—with respect for your ways—in the 
name of Jesus Christ.”
 In a setting like this, a conference of reli-
giously affiliated law schools, I hope you will 
forgive me as I speak quite personally in my 
way—with respect for your ways—about how 
we think about our vocations and steward-
ships as scholars of faith at byu Law School.
 Of course I must begin with a larger-
than-usual disclaimer: I will be talking about 
our ideals, not necessarily our successes in 
measuring up to those ideals.
Our	Mission	to	Study	Law	in	the	Light
The byu Law School’s mission statement 
begins: “The mission of the J. Reuben Clark 
Law School is to teach the laws of men in the 
light of the laws of God.”
 This statement can be traced to the 
charge given by another Church leader, 
President Marion G. Romney, a counselor 
in the First Presidency of the Church, dur-
ing the opening ceremony on the first day of 
classes at byu Law School on August 27, 1973. 
On that occasion President Romney said 
the board of trustees established byu Law 
School “so that there may be an institution 
in which you, the members of this class, and 
all those who shall follow you, may ‘obtain a 
knowledge of . . . [the] laws of . . . man’ in the 
light of the ‘laws of God’ [d&c 93:53].”
 We repeat this mission statement often, 
but it took me about five years to pick up on 
something important: President Romney did 
not charge us to study the laws of men “in 
light of ” the laws of God. “In light of ” would 
seem to suggest “as measured against,” or 
using the laws of God as a kind of yardstick. 
Rather, he challenged us to study the laws 
of men in the light of the laws of God. This 
articulation suggests that God’s laws serve 
not as a yardstick but as a source of illumi-
nation. In shorthand fashion, we speak of 
studying “law in the light.”
God’s	Light
What might it mean to study law in the light 
of God’s laws? To my mind, the most impor-
tant doctrine common to the Abrahamic 
faiths—the Jewish, Christian, and Muslim 
religions—is that God created all of us, His 
children, in His image. In the first chapter 
of Genesis we read, “And God said, Let us 
make man in our image, after our likeness. 
. . . So God created man in his own image, in 
the image of God created he him; male and 
female created he them” (Genesis 1:26–27).
 Reflecting upon this idea, the philoso-
pher Jeremy Waldron helped me see some-
thing new in the New Testament story in 
which a group of Pharisees sought to entan-
gle Jesus using a question about whether 
or not it is lawful to give tribute to Caesar. 
Jesus, sensing their motives, asked to see the 
tribute money and asked his interlocutors 
whose image was superscribed on the penny. 
When they answered that it was Caesar’s 
image, Jesus said, “Render therefore unto 
Caesar the things which are Caesar’s; and 
unto God the things that are God’s” (Mat-
thew 22:21; see also verses 15–22).
 I had thought of this scripture as pro-
viding a justification for obeying civil laws 
or as an awareness of two kingdoms—the 
kingdom of God, on the one hand, and the 
kingdom of man, on the other. But Waldron 
provocatively asked: What is it that we are 
to render unto God? What is it that bears a 
superscription of the image of God?
 It is you and I, His children, who are cre-
ated in His image.
 I had missed the important part of the 
story—that we are to render unto God the 
things that are God’s, and that it is you and I 
who are stamped with God’s image and who 
are His.
 When we strive to love and serve God 
we seek to have His image engraved upon 
our countenance. A Book of Mormon scrip-
ture written by the prophet Alma asks, “I 
say unto you, can ye look up to God . . . with 
a pure heart and clean hands? I say unto 
you, can you look up, having the image of 
God engraven upon your countenances?” 
(Alma 5:19).
 In response to the question What is the 
most important part of God’s law? Jesus said, 
“And thou shalt love the Lord thy God with 
all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with 
all thy mind, and with all thy strength: this 
is the first commandment” (Mark 12:30). I 
believe that as scholars of faith our obliga-
tion is to strive to serve God with all our 
“heart, might, mind and strength” (d&c 
 4:2)—with an emphasis, given our chosen 
vocations, on serving Him with our minds.
Becoming	a	Graduate	Program		
of	Real	Consequence
Brigham Young University’s mission state-
ment also says something important with 
respect to our work as scholars of faith. 
byu is primarily devoted to undergradu-
ate teaching and education. The university 
has more than 30,000 students but a rela-
tively small number of graduate programs. 
The idea, I think, is to prepare students 
to pursue graduate studies at other lead-
ing universities in the United States and 
around the world. Indeed, the Law School 
is the only graduate-only program at the 
university.
 But the university’s mission statement 
promotes “scholarly research and creative 
endeavor among both faculty and students, 
including those in selected graduate programs 
of real consequence.” As a law faculty, when 
we gather together to reflect upon our work 
during retreats and in other settings, we 
often discuss whether we are meeting this 
charge of being a graduate program “of real 
consequence” and what that means.
Producing	Influential	and		
Enduring	Legal	Scholarship
As part of its mission statement, the Law 
School also articulates seven goals, includ-
ing one that relates directly to becoming 
a graduate program of real consequence 
through our scholarship.
 This goal is to “produce influential and 
enduring legal scholarship.”
 In our reflective moments, we also think 
about the adjectives influential and endur-
ing. Influential suggests something that is 
authoritative, forceful, weighty, significant, 
important, and crucial (according to the 
Merriam-Webster and the Oxford online 
thesauruses). And enduring carries the 
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connotation of something being continuing 
or long lasting.
 I am not sure what the precise recipe is 
for producing scholarship that is influential 
and enduring, but perhaps I can offer a few 
general suggestions.
 Influential and enduring scholarship will
•  focus on large as opposed to small ques-
tions;
•  focus on lasting issues, not just those of 
contemporary interest or fashion;
•  focus on theory and policy (yes, even 
morality) as opposed to just precedent 
or new needs;
•  focus on important questions, not just 
pressing questions;
•  subject itself to external standards and 
not just strive for internal coherence;
•  seek to illuminate rather than to obscure 
or problematize; and
• seek truth, not just to persuade.
 This last point is perhaps the most impor-
tant. As scholars of faith, our scholarship 
should be not just about the production of 
scholarship—or even its publication in pres-
tigious outlets or even citation counts—but 
rather, at its best, about the pursuit of truth.
 In the Mormon tradition there is a broad 
understanding of what the sources of truth 
are and what it means to seek truth. 
 The Hebrew sage Maimonides said: 
“You must accept the truth from whatever 
source it comes.” 
 The first Latter-day Saint prophet, Joseph 
Smith, said something similar: “The first 
and fundamental principle of our holy reli-
gion is, that we believe that we have a right 
to embrace all, and every item of truth, 
without limitation or without being circum-
scribed” (“Copy of a Letter from Joseph 
Smith Jun. to Mr. Isaac Galland,” March 22, 
1839, in Millennial Star 7, no. 4 (February 
15, 1846): 51). This explains Joseph Smith’s 
skepticism of the various religious creeds 
of his day, which he viewed as limiting. “I 
cannot believe in any of the creeds of the 
different denominations,” he said, “because 
they all have some things in them I cannot 
subscribe to, though all of them have some 
truth. I want to come up into the presence 
of God, and learn all things” (History of The 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, ed. 
B. H. Roberts [Salt Lake City: The Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 2nd ed. 
revised, 1950], 6:57).
 Joseph Smith’s nephew, President 
Joseph F. Smith, who also became a prophet, 
expressed this idea as follows: “We believe 
in all truth, no matter to what subject it may 
refer. No sect or religious denomination 
in the world possesses a single principle of 
truth that we do not accept or that we will 
reject. We are willing to receive all truth, 
from whatever source it may come; for truth 
will stand; truth will endure” (“Devotion to 
the Cause of Zion,” Editor’s Table, Improve-
ment Era, June 1909, 673).
 Mormons, of course, including me, a 
Mormon scholar of faith, are not always so 
courageous or open minded. But this is the 
standard against which we are encouraged 
to measure ourselves and the ideal to which 
we are encouraged to aspire. This is the light 
in which we are encouraged to study the law. 
Another Mormon scripture says, “The glory 
of God is intelligence, or, in other words, 
light and truth” (d&c 93:36).
To	Strive	to	Study	Law	in	the	Light
I will end where I began: by repeating the 
opening sentence of our mission statement: 
“The mission of the J. Reuben Clark Law 
School is to teach the laws of men in the light 
of the laws of God.”
 I like to think of different faith traditions 
as well as nonreligious perspectives and 
each of our efforts to understand and find 
meaning within those traditions as sources 
of illumination. We can each learn the law 
in the light of each other, for each of us is 
not just a collection of positions, with which 
others of us may agree or disagree. Each of 
us is a source of illumination.
 Perhaps, then, this is an ambition that 
can be shared by all scholars of faith—to 
strive, even as we fall short in our striving, to 
study law in the light.
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here were many benefits of attending law school, but one negative aspect was 
the number of times that a defensive player would hit me late and then yell, 
“What are you going to do about it—sue me?”
 I would always answer that I had retained the chief legal counsel for the nfl. 
That would create enough doubt to hold them back for a few plays.
 I am very proud of my jd. My dad was very proud of my jd too. Throughout 
my 18 seasons of professional football he kept asking, “When are you going to get 
a real job?” He pushed me to be prepared. He said, “What are you going to do when 
the day comes that you aren’t playing football anymore?”
 Law school has been a platform for success in my life as I have transitioned 
from professional football. The day after I retired in 2000 I woke up to the realiza-
tion that the one thing I was really, really good at was over. Having my law degree 
opened up opportunities, like my becoming a partner in a large private equity company, that 
would have been impossible without it.
  T H E  N E W  J O E  M O N T A N A     //////   
While I was attending law school in the winter I was playing football in the nfl from July 
through January. In 1991, in the midst of my law school experience, I was thrust into the 
starting lineup for the San Francisco 49ers. Joe Montana was hurt, and I held the reins of the 
most successful team of the decade. The feeling of responsibility was enormous. I struggled 
with every fiber of my being to try to keep the flame of success going, but the team was floun-
dering. It seemed as though all my efforts fell short of the “Joe Montana standard.” I had 
to remind teammates and fans that Joe had thrown an interception once and had actually 
lost a game or two. It was in this environment that an op-ed was written in the San Francisco 
Chronicle: “The Gulf War: It’s Steve Young’s Fault.” I mean this is as tough as it gets—like 
trying to replace Jim McMahon at byu with his 83 ncaa records. It was a frustrating time.
 I found myself on a plane from Salt Lake City to San Francisco sitting next to Stephen R. 
Covey. I opened up to him and unloaded all of my frustration and fear about how hard it was, 
how difficult it was to please so many people, and how I wasn’t living up to their expectations. 
“There are too many guys on the field—11 is unmanageable,” I told him. “There are too many 
variables of focus and preparation with so many people. I should have played golf or tennis.” 
  T O O  M A N Y  P E O P L E  A N D  A  D I F F I C U L T  P L A T F O R M   //////   
He agreed that it was a difficult situation no one would walk into voluntarily. He told me 
that the optimal number for efficient interaction with people in a group is seven. Once 
an eighth person is added, it becomes geometrically more difficult to work efficiently. He 
agreed that 11 was very difficult to manage. 
But he also said that working with “too 
many people” offers the most rewarding 
outcomes in life— the very experience we 
need with agency is being balanced with 
opposition. Succeeding in large numbers is 
the point of it all. It is difficult, yes, but also 
“messy but joyous,” as he put it.
 He reminded me that I had a wonderful 
platform from which to succeed with “too 
many people.” I had the greatest coach in 
Bill Walsh, a once-in-a-lifetime mentor in Joe 
Montana, and an organization that was the 
best in football. I was looking at an oppor-
tunity to find out how good I could be on a 
platform that was a dream to most people.
 I told him that I hadn’t thought of it that 
way. It flipped a switch in my mind. After 
that I felt relieved and invigorated to see all 
of my negative perceptions as challenges 
that helped me discover how good I could 
be as a leader, a teammate, and a quarter-
back. I was really facing a perfect storm of 
opportunity. 
 I understood, and it changed me for 
the better and stayed with me for the rest 
of my football career. I remember racing to 
the practice field the next day hoping that I 
hadn’t been moaning so much that I had lost 
my job. I was looking forward to this oppor-
tunity to find out how good I could be not just 
as a physical athlete but as a spiritual athlete 
too. It became a quest beyond winning and 
losing; it was about my growth as a human 
being. It didn’t become easier; it just became 
more clearly worth it for much bigger reasons.
 The call of a spiritual athlete is gaining 
perspective from higher vistas. It is refining 
and pruning our worst parts and honing and 
strengthening our best parts as we accept the 
difficult circumstances ahead. In fact, just as 
Stephen Covey explained, it’s the degree of 
difficulty we tackle that creates the refining 
steel of our spirits. By eternal decree, the 
formula of “too many people” coupled with 
incessant opposition and then agency to 
choose our reaction to every breadth of expe-
rience becomes the pruning force for good.
  S P I R I T U A L  A T H L E T I C I S M ////   
Spiritual athleticism is driven by a conscious 
self-awareness. The sacrament helps in this 
process. It can become a valuable weekly 
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evaluation between the Lord and us in 
which we ask for His help to see clearly—
“What lack I yet?”1—and then seek His help 
to achieve the changes that are necessary.
 A goal at my private equity firm is to 
recruit the best and brightest people from 
the top schools in the country. But despite the 
incredible intelligence and expertise of the 
candidates, some are missing the ability to 
make the subtle and not-so-subtle day-to-day 
course adjustments for navigating the intri-
cacies of “too many people” and a difficult 
platform. The algorithms of math are easy 
compared to the algorithms of human inter-
action. The ability to look beyond ourselves, 
to be in the moment, to see the dynamics 
of the situation, and to respond accordingly 
seems to be more difficult than finding an 
open receiver. Developing the ability to gain 
perspective is essential. 
  B E I N G  I N  T H E  M O M E N T  W I T H  C H A R I T Y  //////   
This idea of handling dynamics “in the moment” was brought home to me many times by the 
great Reggie White. Reggie was the dominant defensive lineman of my generation. Six feet six 
inches and at least 300 pounds, he was as fast as the wide receivers and as strong as anyone 
on the field. He played most of his career with the Green Bay Packers, and he easily entered 
the Pro Football Hall of Fame. He was a devout Christian and his team’s spiritual leader. 
 For most of the 1990s, the 49ers and the Packers were locked in a battle to see which team 
would go to the Super Bowl each year. These games were always heavy with implications for 
the championship. Frenzied would not overstate the atmosphere around 49er-Packer games 
during that time. When we played the Packers, the number-one concern was always how to 
stop Reggie. We would try with two or three or even four players dedicated to slowing him 
down, but Reggie was a fierce competitor and was almost impossible to stop.
 Unfortunately, I saw him a lot. If he wasn’t sacking me for a loss, he was tackling me as I 
scrambled. But what I remember is that he was never vicious. The atmosphere of the game, 
with all that adrenaline, sometimes got to us. Pressure brings out stuff we would rather hide. 
Reggie, however, would knock me down and immediately transition into a friend. Reach-
ing out his hand, he would say, “Sorry about that. You okay?” or “How’s your family? Say hi 
to your dad for me.” My dad and Reggie had become friends when we were rookies going 
into the usfl. Reggie had a lot of questions about agents, and my dad, who was a corporate 
attorney, was a trusted resource for him.
 Honestly, there were times I could tell that Reggie had forgotten where he was. I had to 
remind him that as much as I wanted to chat, I had to get back to work. I would tell him, “Let’s 
not meet again until after the game, and then we can catch up.”
 Despite those awkward exchanges that I remember so well, over time I have come to 
understand what an incredible non-football talent Reggie had acquired: the ability to be in 
the moment—and when I say that, I mean really in the moment—having every ounce of you 
physically and emotionally invested at that moment on the field, and then to transition from 
competitor to friend so completely. He was above the moment, looking down and seeing 
it in all of its potential for good. I guess you could say it in another way: Reggie knew how 
to be in the moment but not of the moment. It takes spiritual discipline. It also demands 
eternal perspective to see beyond yourself, not just in quiet reflection but right now, in the 
din of play.
Steve Young (8) 
scored touchdowns 
by running, pass-
ing, and receiving 
when the Cougars 
defeated Missouri 
21–17 in the 1983 
Holiday Bowl. BYU’s 
game-winning 
touchdown came 
on a halfback pass 
from Eddie Stinnett 
to Young that barely 
cleared the out-
stretched arms of a 
Missouri defender.
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 As Latter-day Saints we are constantly 
urged to see our personal interactions 
through the eyes of charity. We know that 
charity in this context is not simply the charity 
of giving our material goods to others. Char-
ity is the pure love of Christ—to see others as 
God Himself sees them. This is not gained by 
any earthly act or acts. It can only come as an 
endowment from our Heavenly Father as we 
learn to love His Son with all our hearts and 
our fellow beings with this same fervor.
 Charity allows us to see opponents, 
litigants, and adversaries for their own 
eternal potential. As an integral part of our 
profession as lawyers, we are called to be 
adversarial. It takes a spiritual athlete to 
be adversarial and charitable at the same 
moment. Reggie was a living example of 
this gift. Reggie has been gone now for a 
few years, but he is sorely missed and often 
remembered. The more I live, the more situ-
ations I encounter in which charity becomes 
the defining element of the interaction. This 
quest for the endowment of charity from on 
high is the most worthy of efforts.
  W O R K I N G  T H R O U G H  M I S T R E A T M E N T  //////
But there is another degree of difficulty beyond the competitive and adversarial bruisings; there 
are the deeper wounds of mistreatment, resentment, grudges, and ill will of every sort. These are 
the things that are not self-inflicted but that are done to us. How can we carry charity into every 
corner of hurt? I turn to the Old Testament and the story of Abigail and David. James Ferrell, in 
his book The Peacegiver, recounts this interaction so well. Abigail, wife of Nabal, had come to 
intercept David as he and his men sped toward Nabal’s home to exact revenge. 
 Nabal had abandoned David and his men at a pivotal moment, even though David had 
spent time and effort protecting Nabal’s flock. I agree with Ferrell that “being mistreated is the 
most important condition of mortality, for eternity itself depends on how we view those who 
mistreat us.”2
 Abigail brought provisions to David and pled for his forgiveness for Nabal’s mistreatment. 
Abigail said:
 I beg for my house [Nabal], yes, but for thee also, my lord, that this shall not be an offence of 
heart unto thee, either that thou hast shed blood causeless, or that my lord hath avenged himself. For 
the Lord will certainly make thee a sure house because my lord fighteth the battles of the Lord, and 
evil hath not been found in thee all thy days. So it ever may be so, my lord, I pray thee, forgive the 
trespass of thine handmaid.3
 Abigail was begging David to not sin by avenging his mistreatment. She was placing herself 
between Nabal and David, hoping to dissuade David from seeking revenge against Nabal.
  Ferrell wrote: 
The atonement is as much for the benefit of the sinned against—the victim of sin—as for the sinner. . . . It sug-
gests also that one of the effects of sin is to invite those who have been sinned against—David, in this case—to 
become sinful themselves, and that the atonement provides the escape from such provocation to sin.4
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 A higher level of spiritual athleticism is to realize that we cannot righteously hold resent-
ment, grudges, or ill will for mistreatment we have suffered. The Savior stands between us 
in these interactions. Ferrell wrote:
 The Lord, by taking the sins of our Nabals upon his head, extends us the same mercy. “Upon 
me let this iniquity be,” he pleads. “Let me deal with it if there is any dealing to be done. But you, 
my dear son or dear daughter, let it go. Let me take it, as I already have done. Forgive.”
 . . . When we withhold forgiveness from others, . . . we are in effect saying that the atonement 
alone was insufficient to pay for this sin. We are holding out for more. We are finding fault with 
the Lord’s offering. We are in essence demanding that the Lord repent of an insufficient atonement. 
So when we fail to forgive another, it is as if we are failing to forgive the Lord—who . . . needs no 
forgiveness.5
 We here need to become the best spiritual athletes as we negotiate the difficult balance 
of being in the world but not of the world among “too many people” and on the platform 
that is ours. It sounds like I need to go stretch my spiritual hamstring just saying that. We are 
asked to wrestle with justice and mercy and, coincidentally, to deftly work with the ironies 
of life with way “too many people.”
  G A I N I N G  T R U E  P E R S P E C T I V E  //////
I want to close with a story about perspective on the football field. I am six feet tall. Line-
men are taller than that. There were times I couldn’t see an open receiver because of the 
linemen looming over me. I couldn’t jump up on stilts; I couldn’t spring up and look around 
and throw. This happened to me on more than one occasion. I would see Jerry Rice—my 
favorite receiver—just moments before. I knew he was headed in the right direction and I 
knew where he was going, so I decided to throw the ball—blindly, in faith, with only a gut 
feeling. I started doing that more and actually became very good at it. Looking back, 
some of my greatest memories on the football field were ones where I would drop 
back to pass and couldn’t see the receiver, but I knew where he was going and I 
would throw anyway.
 I remember in Atlanta one time when I dropped back to pass and got 
knocked down. Just as I was getting hit I threw the ball, even 
though I couldn’t see Jerry. He caught the pass while 
I was at the bottom of the pile. I remember thinking 
to myself as the crowd quieted and we looked 
like we’d won the game, “This is the greatest 
moment of my career; I’ve thrown another 
ball blind.”
 What’s interesting about this is 
that it was never in the newspaper. 
People didn’t say, “Oh, Steve Young 
throws blind.” It was always some-
thing that was internal. Perspective is 
gained in incremental moments as we gain the perspec-
tive of the Savior and become a spiritual athlete.
n o t e s
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           he Ninth Circuit’s recent opinion 
in Garcia v. Google Inc.1 has attracted 
significant attention across the legal, 
political, and business worlds because 
of its possible implications for copy-
right law, free expression, and existing 
business models in the entertainment 
industry.2 The plaintiff, Cindy Lee Gar-
cia, made several requests to Google’s 
YouTube to take down an anti-Islamic 
film hosted on that service that included 
a brief performance by her. Google 
denied each request. Garcia then sought 
a preliminary injunction against Google, 
but she lost at the district court level.3
t
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  On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that 
the district court was wrong in its denial 
of injunctive relief, in part because Garcia 
likely had a copyright interest in her perfor-
mance in the film.4 The court reasoned that 
although Garcia was not a joint copyright 
owner of the film, she could still own an 
independent copyright in her performance 
within it.5 While the court later amended 
its opinion, its basic holdings remained 
the same.6
 Some argue that the court erred in 
so ruling because Garcia’s performance 
does not actually satisfy the Copyright 
Act’s requirements; others suggest 
that the court’s analysis is wrong 
because it fails to properly take into 
account important legislative and 
constitutional protections of free 
expression; and yet others contend 
that the result is mistaken because of 
its likely practical effects on certain 
business models.7
 In contrast, this essay articulates 
a theory for why we should be uneasy 
with the outcome of Garcia. I argue 
that Garcia is bad law because it is 
the epitome of “ex post incentives” 
leading to “ex post IP.” I define “ex 
post incentives” as incentives to 
claim intellectual property (IP) rights 
that are incidental to the creation of 
the work; often they arise in contexts 
such as Garcia, where parties seek to 
use IP law to protect interests beyond 
those that IP law was meant to serve. 
I define “ex post IP” as IP rights 
whose scope is exceedingly unclear 
even after creation of the work; the 
rights must be determined, if at all, 
after the fact in a court of law.
 I suggest that scenarios involv-
ing ex post incentives and ex post 
IP contravene the theory and pur-
pose underlying the constitutional 
provision that provides for copyright law. 
Furthermore, this theoretical framework is 
helpful in identifying and assessing other 
thorny problems in IP law as well. In par-
ticular, I argue that this framework provides 
a better theoretical understanding for why 
we should disfavor patent trolls, or patent 
owners who do not make products but sue 
others who do.
Garcia’s Predicament
The plaintiff in Garcia, Cindy Lee Garcia, found herself mired in a potentially dangerous con-
troversy. She agreed to perform a script provided to her as part of a low-budget amateur film 
titled Desert Warrior. For her three and a half days of filming she was paid $500. Subsequently, 
the scene was altered and used in Innocence of Muslims, an anti-Islamic film. Once the film 
became available on YouTube, outrage in the Islamic world and elsewhere ensued. Protests 
erupted around the globe, with some suggesting that the attack on the U.S. embassy in Beng-
hazi, Libya, was in response to the film.8 Garcia eventually even received death threats.9
 Understandably, Garcia wanted to stop access to the film. What were her options? She 
could sue the film’s producer for breach of contract or some form of fraud. But each of these 
suits would take time to resolve, and meanwhile the film would remain accessible.
 Instead Garcia requested that Google remove the film from YouTube because, she 
claimed, it violated her copyright interest in her performance in the film. Garcia made such 
requests pursuant to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (dmca), which generally 
shields online service providers from copyright liability so long as they meet certain 
requirements, one of which is to respond expeditiously to takedown notices from 
authors claiming that infringing material is located on their service.10 But, as noted, 
Google declined each of her requests. Her request for a preliminary injunction at the 
district court level similarly fell on deaf ears.
Copyright’s Predicament
The Ninth Circuit, by contrast, remanded the case, ruling that Garcia had likely met 
her burden of demonstrating a copyright interest in her performance in the film. The 
court reasoned that her performance was “fixed,” as required by the Copyright Act, 
and appeared to include some amount of creativity—another requirement of the 
Copyright Act—despite being based on a script provided to her.11 That creativity may 
include her “body language, facial expression and reactions to other actors and ele-
ments of a scene.”12
 Rebuttals of the court’s reasoning have been numerous. Some argue that the court 
misconstrued copyright law in a way that will lead to disastrous consequences. For 
instance, if each contributor to a larger work such as a film is deemed to possess a 
copyright interest in her contribution, each such contributor is then able to prevent 
access to the larger work (i.e., precisely the result in Garcia).13 Applying copyright 
law in this manner can thus lead to problems with holdup and censorship while also 
making the work generally unusable due to the fragmented nature of ownership.14
 To help address these and other issues, Congress created the concept of “joint 
work[s],” in which larger works are created “by two or more authors with the inten-
tion that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of 
a unitary whole.”15 According to the majority view, the joint authors of the resulting 
work are only those who at the outset are intended to be coauthors of the overall larger 
work; these authors possess copyright interests in the work.16 Other contributors to 
the work, conversely, do not.
 Concerns with fragmented ownership form the basis of several amici briefs sub-
mitted to the court. For instance, Netflix and several prominent news organizations and 
broadcasters submitted briefs to the court, arguing that their business models were in danger 
should such a decision be upheld.17
 Others argue that the court failed to properly take into account the likely ramifications for 
free expression. For instance, some argue that the decision failed to address important safe 
harbors found in section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.18 Section 230 provides 
robust immunity to online service providers for many types of third-party content hosted on 
their sites and constitutes, according to some, the “legal foundation for many of the most 
popular websites” in the world.19 While section 230 does provide an exception for intellectual 
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property claims, commentators argue that parties such as Garcia increasingly exploit that 
exception in order to remove content that they simply do not like.20
 Relatedly, others suggest that the court improperly applied the standards for granting 
injunctive relief by discounting vital First Amendment considerations and the public’s inter-
est in accessing the film as part of a larger political debate. And it did so solely on the basis 
of a dubious copyright claim.21
The IP Clause and Garcia’s Theoretical Problems
Each of these arguments certainly has merit, but more fundamentally the decision contra-
venes the purpose of and theory behind copyright. Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. 
Constitution empowers Congress to grant authors “the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings” in order to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” The most ubiqui-
tous understanding of this clause, often referred to as the “utilitarian” or “economic incen-
tives” theory of intellectual property law, argues that without providing these incentives 
ex ante, society would suffer because prospective authors would be unwilling to create the 
works for fear that others would simply copy them, thereby undermining any potential 
market for the works.22
 The Constitution’s IP Clause also appears 
to contemplate granting rights in discernible 
“Writings” and other creative works. This 
seems to be one important implication of the 
reference to “respective Writings,” because 
if the boundaries of a work are not discern-
ible, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to 
distinguish between the respective creative 
works of one author over another. Blurry 
rights would also reduce ex ante incentives 
to create, since creators would not be able 
to prospectively assess the risks inherent in 
their creative activity.
 The Constitution’s IP Clause and the 
utilitarian theory behind it, then, appear to 
justify granting intellectual property rights 
in cases where ex ante incentives are neces-
sary for the author to create the work in the first place. They also appear to favor these 
incentives, leading to the creation of what I call ex ante IP, or rights of authors whose bound-
aries are fairly certain even before authors have created the works or such rights have been 
litigated before a court.
Garcia’s Predicament Revisited
In Garcia, rather than ex ante incentives leading to ex ante IP, ex post incentives resulted in 
ex post IP. For instance, Garcia appears to have latched on to copyright as a means of remov-
ing the film once other options were deemed less than ideal. Indeed, in her initial complaint 
she failed to even assert a copyright claim, instead relying on claims of defamation, misrep-
resentation, and fraud.23
 Hence, she had ex post incentives to claim copyright in order to limit access to the film. 
But copyright does not appear to have functioned as an ex ante incentive necessary for her to 
create the work; the incentive for her performance was three days’ worth of pay. For Garcia, 
copyright was a move of last resort rather than an ex ante lure.
 And what exactly are the contours of Garcia’s rights in her performance? The perfor-
mance was based on a script provided to her; she simply performed in accordance with it. 
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that her copyright interest in the performance was thus 
derivative of the underlying copyrighted 
script and further suggested that the scope 
of her rights was somewhat murky.24
 In other words, the court ruled that 
Garcia likely has some rights in the per-
formance, even if it would be hard pressed 
to say what those rights are. Her alleged 
rights exemplify ex post IP, or IP rights that 
are exceedingly unclear until after a court 
has declared what they are. And they may 
remain unclear even after a court’s deter-
mination, as in Garcia.
 In contrast, the rights attendant to ex 
ante IP are known with a good amount of 
certainty even before creation of the work 
and absent any court opinion. To illustrate: 
when an author writes a book, the author 
has certain rights that in some respects 
are well defined. The author knows that in 
nearly all cases no one can copy the book in 
its entirety without her authorization. Fur-
thermore, if someone wants to translate 
the book into another language or make a 
movie out of it, the author knows that in 
nearly all cases she will need to authorize 
that activity as well.
 However, some potential rights in the 
book are less certain. For instance, can 
someone copy a large portion of the book 
in order to criticize it and society in general 
without the author’s consent? What about 
simply using some passages from the book, 
or perhaps following its general structure, 
without copying the exact contents? The 
answers to these questions are uncertain at 
best, even upon creation of the book, and 
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  The problems associated with ex post 
IP are also manifest in the activities of 
patent trolls and patent law more gener-
ally. For instance, one pervasive complaint 
with the patent system is that the boundar-
ies of patents are often difficult to discern 
and that patent trolls exploit this feature 
to their advantage in order to force parties 
to settle what are often otherwise weak 
legal claims.30 That is, because the costs 
of paying off the patent trolls are less than 
litigating the matter to determine precisely 
the boundaries of the patents, many of the 
accused simply settle. In such cases, ex post 
IP remains ex post IP. And society suffers as 
a result.
 In sum, the lessons of Garcia can be 
applied more broadly to IP law in general. 
While at first blush Garcia and patent trolls 
may appear to have little in common, the 
theoretical framework laid out in this essay 
connects them in a way that enables us to 
better assess the common problems in each.
Conclusion
The Ninth Circuit’s Garcia decision was 
wrong for a number of reasons. This essay 
has focused on identifying constitutional 
and theoretical reasons why it was wrong 
and applying that framework to other con-
troversial IP topics, such as patent trolls. 
This theoretical framework suggests that 
denying ex post IP rights where primarily 
ex post incentives are at play would improve 
the efficacy of IP law in general. Others have 
suggested a variety of reforms to IP law,31 
and this essay provides those and other 
reform proposals with theoretical guidance 
on the best way to implement them. With-
out such reforms and a consistent theory 
behind them, IP law runs the risk of expand-
ing and morphing in ways that hinder rather 
than promote innovation and creativity. And 
in so doing, IP law flouts the very reasons for 
which it was instituted.
in order to be answered definitively, the questions would need to be litigated. These types 
of ex post IP rights are similar to the rights that the Ninth Circuit determined Garcia likely 
has in her performance: unclear without litigation and perhaps still unclear even after a 
court ruling.
The IP Clause and IP Theory Revisited
Clearly not all uncertainty associated with IP rights can be eliminated; courts will remain 
necessary to interpret and apply the law. Some even suggest that in certain cases uncertainty 
in IP law plays a positive role.25 But generally, greater certainty leads to greater predictabil-
ity, which typically should promote greater innovation and creativity as parties are able to 
more accurately take into account the risks of their activities. As a general theoretical, 
constitutional, and practical matter, in most cases we should favor ex ante IP over 
ex post IP rights.
 The same conclusion holds true when comparing ex ante incentives to ex post 
incentives. The constitutional basis for granting IP rights is to promote innovative 
activities by holding forth ex ante the lure of exclusive rights. If that lure is unneces-
sary and society receives the creative works without it, society is overall better off.
 When ex post incentives combine with ex post IP rights, the theoretical, practical, 
and constitutional justifications for IP law are at their nadir. The Garcia decision is a clear 
example of such a scenario. Garcia claimed copyright only in order to protect her bodily 
interests, not her expressive ones. And even once she claimed copyright, it isn’t clear, even 
according to the court, what interests she was claiming. Ex post incentives combined with 
ex post IP rights in Garcia to leave us all in doubt.
A Theoretical Strike Against Patent Trolls
The theoretical framework drawn from Garcia can be applied to other vexing problems in IP 
law as well. For instance, one of the more contentious issues in patent law today concerns 
patent trolls, or those patent owners who do not practice their patents but sue others who do.
 Commentators often react negatively to the activities of such entities but without offer-
ing a clear theoretical reason as to why we should disfavor them. I suggest that, similar to 
Garcia, we should disfavor patent trolls because they are, in the patent world, the epitome of 
ex post incentives leading to the creation and/or claiming of ex post IP rights. Patent trolls, 
for instance, often acquire their patents from corporations that have no real need for the 
patents and simply sell them off in order to monetize them.26 The patent trolls, therefore, 
have ex post incentives to acquire the patent rights; by definition the patents are not acting 
as ex ante incentives to their (lack of ) innovative activity.
 But even if patent trolls do not have ex ante incentives, the corporations and other par-
ties from which they acquire the patent rights may. For instance, some almost certainly 
pursue innovative activity in pursuit of patent rights; the ex ante possibility of patent rights—
including the ability to sell them at a later date—may inform their decision to pursue the 
innovative activity in the first place. In this light, patent trolls may be an important piece of 
the innovation puzzle rather than an overall detriment to it.27
 While this line of reasoning may hold true in some cases, in many others it seems dubious. 
Corporations often acquire patents not for ex ante incentive reasons but because they simply 
lack business sense not to pursue patents for innovations that the corporations are already 
pursuing. Indeed, in many cases they may feel compelled to pursue patents simply because 
others do. But the resulting patent nuclear-arms race should not necessarily be construed 
as evidence that parties would not innovate but for the lure of patents; it may be better con-
strued as evidence that patent law’s strict liability regime requires acquisition of patents for 
defensive purposes.28 In other words, an incentive to acquire patents may exist, even if the 
patent itself is not acting as a necessary ex ante incentive to innovation. Other factors, such 
as competition, may be the true catalysts to the innovative activity in many cases.29
IP law runs the risk of 
expanding and morphing 
in ways that hinder 
rather than promote 
innovation and creativity.
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      t is truly a privilege to deliver this lecture today. I should tell you that I feel a special 
relationship to your law school. When I was part of creating the law school at the Uni-
versity of California, Irvine, the school we most modeled ourselves after and ultimately 
learned the most from was this law school. So it is really special to be with you today.
 Carrie Buck was born in 1906 in Charlottesville, Virginia. She went through the 
local elementary school and junior high school; she passed every year along with her 
grade. In all accounts, she was a normal child.
 But her father left her mother, and her mother was destitute. Her mother lacked 
resources to take care of Carrie and Carrie’s sister, Doris, so she put her two daughters in 
foster homes. Carrie stayed with her foster family doing chores and housework. When she 
was 17, she was raped by her foster father’s nephew, and she became pregnant as a result of 
the rape. Her foster parents were humiliated by her pregnancy and had her institutionalized. 
She was placed in what was called “a home for the feeble minded.” There she gave birth to 
a daughter.
 Soon after, the state of Virginia began proceedings to get Carrie surgically sterilized. 
Virginia, like states across the country, had adopted eugenic laws. A brief hearing was held. 
An expert said that he had administered an iq test to Carrie—this was a very new test—and 
that her iq was below normal. (I should note here that many years later, Stephen Jay Gould, 
then a Harvard professor, went and found Carrie Buck. He administered a contemporary iq 
test, and her iq was in the normal range.) A social worker testified at the hearing that she had 
looked at Carrie’s baby, who was six months old at the time, and “something didn’t seem 
right about the baby girl.” The hearing officer ordered that Carrie be surgically sterilized.
 The case came to the United States Supreme Court. It should have been an easy case 
for the Court. The Constitution and the Eighth Amendment of course prohibit cruel and 
unusual punishment. Wasn’t this exactly what was being done to Carrie Buck? After all, she 
had done nothing wrong. Before this time the Supreme Court had held that the due process 
clause protected fundamental rights. Isn’t the right to procreate one of these fundamental 
rights? But the Supreme Court, in an 8 to 1 decision, ruled against Carrie Buck. Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, one of the most renowned Justices to ever serve on the High Court, wrote 
the decision and used some of the most insensitive and offensive language found in the 
United States Reports when he wrote, “Three generations of imbeciles are enough.” As a result 
of the eugenics laws and this 1927 Supreme Court decision, Buck v. Bell, 60,000 American 
citizens were involuntarily surgically sterilized.
t h e  s u p r e m e  c o u r t  a n d  t h e  c o n s t i t u t i o n
I have now been a law professor for 35 years, and I teach Buck v. Bell each year. A couple of 
years ago my students were particularly outraged by the decision, and I found myself mak-
ing excuses for the Supreme Court. But the more I thought about it, the more I realized that 
on many occasions I had made excuses for the Supreme Court when teaching particularly 
outrageous and offensive decisions, like Dred Scott v. Sandford, Plessy v. Ferguson, and Kore-
matsu v. United States. So I forced myself to think more critically about the Supreme Court.
 I realized that the Court has often failed in its most important tasks in its most important 
times, and I started to write a book about this. The book, titled The Case Against the Supreme 
Court, was published last month.
 Now, obviously if I am going to say that the Supreme Court has failed, I need criteria to 
evaluate its performance. I think we can all agree that the Court exists, above all, to enforce 
the Constitution, but this requires us to think about why we have a constitution. Whenever 
I teach constitutional law, to law students or undergraduates, I always ask them on the first 
day to think about this question, and of course this requires that they reflect on how the 
Constitution is different from all other laws. The answer is that the Constitution is much 
more difficult to change. Any statute or ordinance can be changed by the next session of the 
legislature or in the city council, but to change the Constitution requires two-thirds approval 
of both houses of Congress and passage by three-quarters of the states.
I
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 But then I ask my students, “Why should a nation that sees itself as a democracy, that 
believes in majority rule, constitute itself in a document that is difficult to change?” After all, 
none of us voted to approve the Constitution. My guess is that few of us had ancestors in this 
country in 1787 who approved the Constitution.
 The answer I then give is that I believe that the Constitution is an attempt 
by society to restrain itself. The Constitution puts our most precious val-
ues—values about the structure of government and values about individual 
freedom—in a document that is intentionally difficult to change. I believe 
that this is, in part, to protect minorities, because the majority can usually 
protect itself through the democratic process. It is minorities who need a 
Constitution and a judiciary for protection.
 I also believe that the Constitution exists to restrain what the govern-
ment can do in times of crisis. The framers knew of world history: history 
illustrates that in times of crisis there is a tendency to centralize power and 
take away freedom. The Constitution, then, is an elaborate edifice to make 
sure that our short-term passions don’t cause us to lose sight of our long-
term values. If you’ll accept these goals of the Constitution and these pur-
poses for the Supreme Court, then I think I can make the case for you that 
the Supreme Court has so often failed throughout American history in the 
most important tests in the most important times.
 The first third of the book The Case Against the Supreme Court looks at the Supreme Court 
historically, the second third looks at the Roberts Court, and the final third asks what we 
should do about this problem.
t h e  s u p r e m e  c o u r t  a n d  i s s u e s  o f  r a c e
I believe that any analysis of the Supreme Court and its historic performance has to begin 
with the area of race. I believe that historically, and even now, the Supreme Court has a dis-
mal record with regard to race. From 1787 to 1865, a period of 78 years, the Supreme Court 
aggressively enforced the institution of slavery and protected the rights of slave owners. In 
your constitutional law class you might have read Prigg v. Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania adopted 
a law that prohibited the use of force or violence in removing a slave who had escaped there 
from a slave state. The Fugitive Slave Clause in Article 4 of the Constitution said that a slave 
who had escaped to a free state would have to be returned. Pennsylvania didn’t prevent that 
from happening; it just prevented force or violence from being used. Doesn’t every state have 
an interest in preventing force and violence? But the Supreme Court declared that Pennsyl-
vania law unconstitutional.
 Justice Joseph Story wrote the opinion of the Court. Justice Story is also one of the most 
celebrated Justices to ever serve on the Supreme Court and the youngest to ever be appointed 
to the Court. At Harvard Law School there is a dorm named after him. In Iowa there is a statue 
of him. Yet, shouldn’t his reputation be tarnished by this decision that so aggressively pro-
tected the rights of slave owners?
 I am sure that in your law classes on the Constitution you have talked about Dred Scott v. 
Sandford, which held that slaves are not citizens, even if they are born in the United States, 
but are simply property of their owners. The Court declared unconstitutional the Missouri 
Compromise, which helped precipitate the Civil War. Then, from 1896 to 1954, a period of 
58 years, the Supreme Court aggressively enforced the doctrine of “separate but equal.” The 
Court’s decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, and those that followed it, upheld Jim Crow laws that 
segregated literally every aspect of Southern life.
 As I mention these examples to you, maybe your reaction is, “That was then; it is different 
now.” So let me give you examples from now. Let me talk about a Supreme Court case from 
a year ago June. On June 25, 2013, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional key provi-
sions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The decision, Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, was 
the first time since the 19th century that the Supreme Court has declared unconstitutional 
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 a federal civil rights law dealing with race. I think that the Voting Rights Act of 1965 is one 
of the most important federal laws adopted in my lifetime. Congress knew that litigation to 
enforce this prohibition would be expensive and difficult. Congress was also aware of how 
especially Southern states were continually changing their election systems to disenfranchise 
minority voters.
 Do you remember the old game Whac-a-Mole—knock the mole down in one place and it 
pops up in another? That’s what Congress thought was going on, especially in the Southern 
states. A law would be adopted to disenfranchise minority voters; it would be struck down, 
only to be replaced by another that was just as bad. So Congress added Sec-
tion 5 to the Voting Rights Act. It says that jurisdictions with a prior history 
of race discrimination in voting must get preclearance from the attorney 
general to change their election systems. Section 4B of the Act determines 
which jurisdictions need to get preclearance. Under the current version, this 
includes nine states, almost all the South, and local governments that are 
scattered across the country.
 These provisions were scheduled to expire in 1982. Congress held 
extensive hearings and then voted to extend these provisions another 25 
years. President Ronald Reagan signed them into law. The provisions were 
scheduled to expire in 2007. In 2006 Congress held 20 hearings and com-
piled legislative history 16,000 pages long documenting continuing race 
discrimination in voting in the covered jurisdictions. The Senate voted 98 
to nothing to extend these provisions another 25 years. Can you imagine the 
Senate today voting anything 98 to nothing? There were only 33 “no” votes 
in the House. President George W. Bush signed the provisions into law.
 Shelby County, Alabama, is south of Selma, Alabama. It is in a jurisdiction with a long 
history of race discrimination in voting. It brought a challenge to this law. On Tuesday, June 
25, 2013, the Supreme Court, in a 5 to 4 decision, declared unconstitutional Section 4B of the 
Voting Rights Act. Remember that this is the provision that determines which jurisdictions 
need to get preclearance. Once this provision is invalidated, no jurisdictions need to get 
preclearance. Chief Justice John Roberts wrote the opinion for the Court. He said, “Race 
discrimination in voting is largely a thing of the past.” He also said, “The formula in Section 
4B was based on outdated statistics,” and, “This violates the principle of equal state sover-
eignty, that Congress must treat all states alike.”
 But where in the Constitution does it say that? Now, I’m not an originalist. I don’t believe 
that the meaning of the Constitution is limited by what its framers intended. But if there is 
anything about which I am confident when talking about original intent, it is that the Con-
gress that ratified the 14th and 15th Amendments didn’t believe that Congress had to treat 
all states the same. That Congress is, after all, the Congress that passed the Reconstruction 
Act and created military rule over the South.
 Immediately after this 2013 decision, states such as Texas and North Carolina put into 
effect discriminatory voting laws that denied preclearance.
 But the story doesn’t stop there. Let me talk about an event as recent as a week ago Satur-
day, October 18, 2014. At 5:30 a.m. the Supreme Court allowed to go into effect the Texas law 
that had been found by a district court to likely keep 600,000 African Americans and Latinos 
in Texas from voting in the coming election on Tuesday, November 4. A federal district court 
judge in Texas had held a nine-day trial. She issued a 143-page opinion finding the Texas 
photo ID law the most restrictive in the country, keeping, as I said, about 600,000 people 
from voting. She found that the purpose and the effect of this statute was to disenfranchise 
minority voters. A three-judge panel had come to the same conclusion in 2011 and had kept 
preclearance from being granted, only for the verdict to be made irrelevant after the Shelby 
County decision.
 Now as you may know from your classes, a preliminary injunction from the district court 
can be overturned only if it is found to be an abuse of discretion. It is hard to imagine how 
this could be an abuse of discretion. Four federal judges have come to the same conclusion. 
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The first of those federal judges held a nine-day trial. She wrote a 143-page opinion. But 
on Saturday morning, October 18, the Supreme Court, in what seems to be a 6 to 3 ruling, 
allowed the Texas law to go into effect. The Justice of the majority issued no opinion—not a 
word of explanation. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a blistering dissent.
t h e  s u p r e m e  c o u r t  i n  t i m e s  o f  c r i s i s
I want to give a second example of the Supreme Court’s failings throughout American 
history—how it has enforced the Constitution in times of crisis. If you will buy my premise 
that a preeminent role of the Constitution is to protect rights in times of crisis, again I think 
the Supreme Court has dismally failed.
 Let me give a few specific examples. During World War I, in 1917 and 1918, Congress 
adopted statutes that made it a federal crime to criticize the draft for the war efforts. The 
first major case concerning freedom of speech to be decided by the Supreme Court rose from 
one of these statutes. If you have studied First Amendment law, you are familiar with it; it is 
a case called Schenck v. United States.
 It involved a man who circulated a leaflet that argued that the military draft was uncon-
stitutional as a form of involuntary servitude. There wasn’t a shred of evidence that his 
leaflet had the slightest adverse effect on military recruitment or the war effort. But just 
d e a n  e r w i n  c h e m e r i n s k y
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 for circulating that leaflet, not doing anything else, he was convicted and sentenced to 10 
years in prison. The Supreme Court, in an opinion again by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
affirmed the conviction in a sentence. If you remember this case at all, this is when the 
Supreme Court said that the government can punish speech if there’s “a clear and present 
danger” of harm. This is also when the Court said that there’s no right to falsely shout “fire” 
into a crowded theater. But if anything is the antithesis of a clear and present danger—a 
falsely shouted “fire” into a crowded theater—isn’t it Schenck’s harmless leaflet?
 Another case decided that same year involved the socialist leader Eugene Debs. He gave 
a speech to a group of college students in which he said, “You are fit for something better than 
slavery and cannon fodder. There’s more I’d like to say but I can’t for fear of imprisonment.” 
For that speech he was convicted and sentenced to 10 years in prison. Again the Supreme 
Court upheld his conviction in one sentence. Debs ran for president while in prison; he died 
soon after his pardon.
 We can also talk about World War II, when 110,000 Japanese Americans, aliens and 
citizens—70,000 of whom were United States citizens—were uprooted from their homes 
and placed in what President Franklin Roosevelt called concentration camps. 
Race alone determined who would be free and who would be put behind 
barbed wire. Many of these families were literally housed in horse stalls. The 
case, Korematsu v. United States, came to the Supreme Court in 1944. When-
ever you take constitutional law, you will read this case. I think the decision 
should have been easy for the Supreme Court. This was race discrimination, 
pure and simple. In England procedures were devised to screen those of Ger-
man ancestry to see if they were a threat to national security. Nothing like 
that was done in the United States. Race was used to determine who would 
be free and who would be in prison. The Supreme Court, in a 6 to 3 decision, 
upheld the evacuation of Japanese Americans. Justice Hugo Black wrote the 
opinion of the Court. He said, “War is about hardship, and these are just the 
hardships that Japanese Americans will have to bear.”
 Or we can talk about the McCarthy era. It was truly the age of suspicion. 
Merely to be suspected of being a communist was often enough for a person 
to lose a job or even liberty. The leading Supreme Court case during this time 
was Dennis v. United States. You actually have to read the dissenting opinion to figure out what 
these individuals were convicted of. There was a group of individuals who wanted to teach 
the works of Marx, Engel, and Lenin. For this they were convicted of the crime of conspiracy 
to advocate the overthrow of the United States government. They weren’t convicted of plot-
ting the overthrow the government; they weren’t even convicted of advocating the overthrow 
of the government. Their crime was conspiracy to advocate the overthrow of the government. 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court approved their conviction. Chief Justice Fred Vinson wrote 
the opinion for the Court. He said, “When the evil is as grave as the overthrow of the United 
States government, there doesn’t have to be any proof that the speech increases the likeli-
hood of it happening.”
 Again, I know of the temptation to say, “Well, those cases were a long time ago. We’re 
more enlightened now.” So let me give an example from now. We could start by talking about 
those who have been detained and continue to be detained as part of the War on Terror. In fact, 
let me ask each of you to engage in a thought experiment: How many people has the United 
States government detained, or how many does it continue to detain as part of the War on 
Terror? I am confident that none of you knows the answers to those questions because the 
government has not told us the answers. Several years ago I debated with Michael Chertoff, 
head of the Department of Homeland Security, in front of a group of federal judges. When I 
asked him these questions, he said, “I can’t tell you; it’s classified.” We still don’t know.
 But we do know that approximately 169 individuals remain in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, 
and some of them have been there since the spring of 2002. I have represented one detainee, 
Salin Garebi, since the summer of 2002. To this day he has never had a trial or a meaningful 
factual hearing. He has been in custody now for 12 and a half years—longer than any war in 
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American history—and yet the Supreme Court has not provided any relief to Salin Garebi or 
to the others in Guantánamo.
 I can think of one more example of how the Court has made poor decisions in times of 
crisis, again drawing from the War on Terror: it is a Supreme Court decision in 2010 called 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project. Some Americans wanted to help some Kurdish indi-
viduals; specifically, they wanted to help teach them about how to use the United Nations in 
international law for peaceful resolution of disputes. Other Americans wanted to help a Sri 
Lankan group of foreigners apply for international humanitarian assistance. It is important 
that you know that all the parties to the litigation agreed that this is what the Americans 
wanted to do. No one said that these Americans were trying to teach the foreigners how to 
engage in terrorist acts or were giving them money that could be used for terrorist acts. The 
question that arose was that for doing just what I have described and nothing more, could 
they be convicted of the crime of giving material assistance to a foreign terrorist organiza-
tion? The Supreme Court, in a 6 to 3 decision, said that this speech and this speech alone was 
enough material assistance to terrorist organizations. Chief Justice John Roberts wrote for the 
Court; Justice Stephen Breyer’s dissent lamented that there wasn’t any evidence whatsoever 
that this speech would pose any threat or increase the likelihood of terrorist activity.
 In the second part of the book, I talk about the Roberts Court and about how the Rob-
erts Court is the most pro-business court since the 1930s, consistently favoring the rights of 
corporations over those of employees or consumers. I also talk about how the Roberts Court 
consistently favors government power over individual rights, and I talk about things that 
we study in civil rights classes, such as how the Supreme Court has dramatically expanded 
governmental immunity.
f i x i n g  t h e  s u p r e m e  c o u r t
So I have to ask the question: What should we do about it?
 There are some law professors, even very prominent ones, who argue that the solution 
should be to eliminate Constitutional judicial review. Harvard law professor Mark Tushnet 
wrote a book titled Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts, in which he says we should 
eliminate Constitutional judicial review. Former Stanford Law School dean Larry Kramer 
wrote a book that comes to a similar conclusion and argues for what he calls “popular Consti-
tutionalism,” which leaves the Constitution to the people to enforce. Pulitzer Prize–winning 
author and Williams College political science professor James MacGregor Burns wrote a book 
just a few years ago in which he also argues for the elimination of judicial review. These three 
authors each make the point that other countries have democracy and individual freedom 
without judicial review. In England no court has ever had the power to declare unconstitu-
tional an act of Parliament. In the Netherlands there is a written constitution, but it specifi-
cally provides that no court can declare a law unconstitutional for violating it.
 Yet I reject this approach. I believe that Marbury v. Madison was right in saying that the 
written limits of the Constitution are meaningful only if they can be enforced, and enforce-
ment requires the judiciary. I have spent almost 40 years representing people on death row, 
criminal defendants, a Guantánamo detainee, a homeless man. I know that for my clients 
it is likely to be the courts or nothing. When was the last time that a legislature passed a law 
to expand the rights of criminal defendants? For me the solution is not to eliminate the judi-
ciary; I believe it is essential to achieve the goals that I described for the Constitution in the 
Supreme Court, but I believe we should think about how can we reform the Supreme Court 
to make such failures as I have described less likely in the future. Consequently, in the last 
chapter of the book, before the conclusion, I offer a set of ideas for reforming the Court.
 I begin by saying that I think we should have the Court clearly declare, and we as a society 
proclaim, that we see the role of the Court as enforcing the Constitution, especially to protect 
minorities and to enforce the Constitution in times of crisis. Never has the Supreme Court 
expressly declared that to be its purpose. I believe that just doing so might help a great deal 
in the future.
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  I also argue that we should change the way Supreme Court Justices are selected and 
confirmed. I argue for merit selection of Supreme Court Justices. I believe that a president 
could create a merit selection committee that can be bipartisan in its membership, and the 
president can have more from his or her political party but require that there be a two-thirds 
recommendation. For example, he could say, “Recommend to me two or three people who 
you think are the best to be on the Supreme Court, and I promise to either pick from them 
or ask you for more names.” There are states that have that kind of merit selection system. 
Alaska is one of them. This has led—even with a conservative governor like Sarah Palin—to 
picking a liberal for the Alaska Supreme Court, Morgan Christen, who President Obama then 
put on the Ninth Circuit.
 President Jimmy Carter had merit selection for federal district courts and federal courts 
of appeal. He never got to pick a Supreme Court Justice. I think by any measure his selections 
were among the very best judges picked by any president—and certainly the most diverse 
judges to that point to be picked by any president.
 I think we need to change the confirmation process to make it meaningful. I think that 
Democrats and Republicans together should agree to a set of questions that every nominee 
for the Supreme Court should have to answer, including questions about their views con-
cerning matters that will come before the Court. There are only two possibilities in which 
we cannot do this. One would be if we think that those who are being nominated don’t have 
any views on disputed legal issues. When Clarence Thomas and David Souter went before 
the Senate judiciary committee, they each said they had no views on Roe v. Wade. Patricia 
Ireland, then president of the National Organization for Women, said, “There are only two 
adults in the United States who don’t have views on Roe v. Wade, and now they’re both going 
to be on the United States Supreme Court.” The other possibility for not asking for their views 
is that if we know their views, they are no longer impartial. But that can’t be right. We know 
how Antonin Scalia and Ruth Bader Ginsburg are going to vote when the question comes 
before them as to whether Roe v. Wade should be overruled. No one says that requires them 
to be disqualified.
 I also favor term limits for Supreme Court Justices—18-year nonrenewable terms. Thank-
fully, life expectancy is so much greater today than it was when the Constitution was written 
in 1787. Clarence Thomas was confirmed to the Supreme Court in 1991, when he was 43 years 
old. If he remains on the Court until he is 90, the age when John Paul Stevens stepped down, 
he will have been a Justice for 47 years. Both John Roberts and Elena Kagan were 50 when 
they were confirmed to the Court. If they remain until they are 90, they will have been there 
for 40 years. That is just too much power to be exercised by a single individual for too long 
a period of time. Additionally, 18-year nonrenewable terms mean that every president will 
get a vacancy to fill every two years. Too much depends now on the accident of history when 
vacancies occur. Richard Nixon had four vacancies to fill in his first two years as president. 
Jimmy Carter had none to fill in his four years as president.
 Further, I argue for changing the way the Court communicates with the American people. 
To pick a single example, I believe there should be cameras in the Supreme Court for every 
argument and every proceeding so that we can see that branch of government at work. I 
believe that the ethical rules that apply to lower federal court judges should apply to Supreme 
Court Justices. No longer should it be left to each Justice to decide for himself or herself 
whether they should be recused in a case.
 I don’t pretend that these reforms singularly or cumulatively will magically change 
the Supreme Court, but I believe they can make a difference. Justice Louis Brandeis, in 
his dissent in Olmstead v. United States, said, “The greatest threat to liberty will come from 
people who claim to be acting for beneficial purposes.” He also said, “People born to free-
dom know to resist the tyranny of despots,” and, “The insidious threat to liberty will come 
from well-meaning people with zeal, with little understanding of what the Constitution 
is about.”
 I believe that throughout American history, all of our Justices have been well-meaning 
people of zeal, but I believe that all too often they have failed us.
P H OTO  C R E D I TS
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THE FRITZ B. BURNS MEMORIAL LOUNGE
On October 22, 2014, members of the Law School community gathered for the opening of the Fritz B. Burns 
Memorial Lounge at J. Reuben Clark Law School. After the ceremony, a portrait of Burns was unveiled in the new 
lobby, where it will hang amid landscapes from Burns’s life.
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Rex Rawlinson, 
president of 
the Fritz B. Burns 
Foundation
left (2): Rex Rawlinson; Cheryl Robinson, a vice 
president and director of the Fritz B. Burns Foundation; 
and Maureen Rawlinson, also a vice president and 
director of the foundation, with a Law School student 
and Dean James Rasband before and after the unveiling 
of Burns’s portrait
below: Matthew Richardson, byu advancement vice 
president; Curtis Swenson, byu director of development; 
and Rex Rawlinson
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David,	’91,	and	Chelom,	’91,	
Leavitt—the	Law	School’s	
2014	honored	alums—started	
the	Leavitt	Institute	for	
International	Development	
in	2005	to	teach	democracy,	
advocacy,	rule	of	law,	and	eth-
ics	in	law	schools	throughout	
Ukraine.	Currently	the	Leavitt	
Institute	teaches	about	400	law	
students	in	10	international	uni-
versities	each	year.	Following	
are	excerpts	from	the	Leavitts’	
Honored	Alumni	Lecture,	
given	on	October	16,	2014,	at	
J.	Reuben	Clark	Law	School.
chelom 	Once when I was a 
five-year-old I wanted a drink 
of water. I had all these older 
sisters, so I asked them to get 
me a drink of water.
 Like older sisters do, they 
said, “No. Get it yourself.”
 My response was, “I’m too 
little.” I was begging them to help 
me, but they didn’t. So I got the 
drink of water on my own.
 Sometimes when I have been 
faced with hard things, I feel 
like I am “too little,” or because 
I have never done something 
before, it looks really hard. I 
think we have all fallen into that 
trap. In social science we call it 
“learned helplessness”; we call it 
“learned incompetence” when it 
becomes a habit. I have learned 
that whatever it is I am facing, I 
can learn. I can change my skills. 
I can gain a new perspective.
 After centuries of oppres-
sion, the people in Ukraine 
have also felt that they are “too 
little.” Different nations have 
controlled and dominated them, 
and changing their govern- 
mental system has seemed 
almost impossible. 
david 	In 2004 we had a very 
busy life. We had a good life. 
We had six great kids. We 
had 50 or 60 legal cases that 
were pressing down on us. 
And for reasons we couldn’t 
articulate, we felt compelled 
to drop everything to go to 
Eastern Europe. We acknowl-
edged that it seemed kind of 
nuts. Nevertheless, through 
miraculous ways, in about a 
three-month period all of our 
cases resolved themselves. One 
by one the obstacles to go to 
Ukraine diminished, and we 
packed our 42 suitcases and left 
with six children in tow.
 The night we left we were 
extremely anxious. A solemn 
sense of foreboding came over 
us.	And we were so busy getting 
ready that we hadn’t looked at 
a newspaper to see what was 
going on in Ukraine. Then, in 
His own unique way, the Lord 
spoke peace to us and helped us 
understand that it would be okay. 
So we boarded the plane and 
went to Ukraine. 
 What we found there 
shocked us: a country in the 
grasp of communism and people 
yearning to break free. We left 
the United States the day before 
John Kerry lost to George W. 
Bush amidst all the color, debate, 
and fanfare of an American pres-
idential election. We showed up 
10 days before Ukraine’s election 
to nothing but blank stares and a 
sense of utter hopelessness.
 We found a system corrupt 
to its core—in all aspects of 
society. For example, if you want 
to go to the university, you have 
to pay the admissions people 
to let you in. If you want an A 
in a class, you have to pay your 
professor. If you want to register 
your car, you have to pay a bribe 
so that the process will be three 
hours rather than three days. 
When we arrived, the going 
THE PRIVILEGE TO SERVE 
Ukrainian artist Marina Lukach 
used fabric, lace, embroidery, and 
bits of glass and blown-out tires 
from the 2014 uprising to create this 
composition, which represents the 
people and landscape of Ukraine.
price for a seat on the Ukraine 
Supreme Court was about 
$100,000. The Ukraine Supreme 
Court salary was around $700 
a month, but judges get the 
money back during their first 
year through bribes.
 The challenge was to convey 
to university students that this 
system wasn’t okay. But to con-
vey that message we had to say, 
“Your responsibility is to sacrifice 
for your country.” We would give 
this example (not understanding 
its future relevance): “If Russia 
was at your border on the east 
and was coming across, you 
would expect the army to stand 
and protect you. You would say 
to the members of the army, ‘If 
not you, then who?’ That’s what 
we also say to you. It takes a 
stable and ethical legal system 
for any society to flourish, and 
if you’re going to be the lawyers 
and if it’s not going to be you 
who stand for that system, then 
who is it going to be?”
 It was a hard method for 
them to implement both person-
ally and institutionally.
chelom  Our purpose was to 
motivate the students to under-
stand that they could stand up to 
this corruption. While they might 
not alone change the nation, they 
could alone change themselves. 
At the beginning of each semes-
ter the students were pretty 
skeptical. They thought it was 
unlikely that any change could 
occur in their country. Then, as 
our volunteer professionals 
would shuttle through Ukraine 
in two-week segments, the stu-
dents would get a personal look 
at them. And they would ask 
these professionals, “What’s in 
this for you? Why did you come 
to teach us here in Ukraine?”
 And, without exception, the 
response would be, “I’m not 
getting anything out of this. I 
came because I want to make a 
difference in your country. In fact, 
I have to pay my own expenses 
to come here.” Each semester, 
we began to see a change in 
these students as they saw 
example after example of people 
willing to make a sacrifice so 
they could make a difference in 
Ukraine. Their minds started to 
open to the possibility of living 
a life without corruption—a life 
of privileged service rather than 
entitlement.
david  It’s that kind of sacrifice 
that changes these students—
it’s the example we set, how we 
act, how kind we are.
chelom  The Leavitt Institute 
has had 186 professionals vol-
unteer more than 22,000 hours 
of legal time and has received 
nearly $2 million in embassy 
funding and more than $500,000 
in private donations. If you com-
bine all the in-kind legal work, 
that adds up to nearly $4.5 mil-
lion of private donations. Leavitt 
Institute professionals have 
flown nearly three million miles 
to provide their service. We have 
had eight llms graduate from the 
McGeorge or byu law schools 
and more than 30 Moldovan 
and Ukrainian interns come to 
the United States or Canada for 
three-week internships.
 We have often had young 
people ask us, “What’s the 
most important thing you’ve 
done?” Without hesitation I tell 
them that the most important 
thing I have ever done is to be 
a mom. Ukraine has certainly 
blessed us professionally and 
personally, but it has also 
blessed our children. We lived 
in Ukraine on three different 
occasions, and they learned 
about the privilege of service 
because they were included in 
the process. Our success would 
be pretty meaningless if it had 
come at the cost of the success 
in our family.
 As an example of our family’s 
growth, when we had been in 
Ukraine less than a week, I had 
our twins—they were seven 
at the time—take the long trip 
down to the dumpster to take 
the garbage out. As we passed 
the dumpster later on our way 
to church, we saw an old woman 
digging through the garbage that 
we had just thrown out, eating 
the leftovers of our breakfast. 
My twins cried the whole way 
to church. On our way home, we 
talked about what we might do. 
We certainly could not take care 
of the whole hunger problem in 
Ukraine, so we decided that if 
we had food that was still edible, 
we would put it in a separate 
bag, and we would put the bag 
beside the dumpster so some-
one didn’t have to dig through all 
the garbage to find it.
david 	Doing what we can  
do is all that is required of 
us. Heaven expects us to try. 
Service expands us; it makes  
us into people we didn’t know 
we could become.
 I remember a walk Chelom 
and I took in the early morning 
so we could talk. We saw an old 
man who looked ancient. He had 
a neatly-cared-for suit, but the 
suit was at least 30 years old. He 
was gently rummaging through 
the garbage.
 It struck both of us how dif-
ficult it must be to be reduced to 
looking for a meal in the garbage 
when your life had been so much 
more. He found a partly eaten 
apple; examined it, looking for a 
part that was edible; and took a 
small bite. It wasn’t an uncom-
mon scene, but it reminded us of 
the scripture “I was an hungred, 
and ye gave me meat.”1 We had 
already passed him when we 
both simultaneously stopped. 
We took out all the money that 
we had and gave it to him. It 
wasn’t much, but he looked at 
us and in a very old voice said, 
“Thank you, thank you.”
 How service presents itself 
will be different for each of 
us. For the lawyer it may be 
that the hungered person is a 
single mother who can’t afford 
a lawyer. For a businessman 
it may be a single parent who 
needs some extra time and 
understanding to get to work. 
Whatever our circumstances, 
we face those who represent 
the Savior. The critical question 
is not what we give them but 
that we give when we can.
chelom  Wherever you find 
yourself, there will be limitless 
need. We don’t have to be in a 
certain geographical spot. We 
need to have hearts that are soft, 
ears that hear, eyes that see the 
need, and then, more than any-
thing, the desire to be an instru-
ment in God’s hands. The Lord 
can do His own work. It is actu-
ally a pleasure—a privilege—that 
we are included in it. He includes 
us because our development is 
also part of His work.
  “Be still, and know that I am 
God.”2 When you start to feel too 
small, be still and know that you 
are a part of something bigger, 
something that will not fail. We 
live in a contentious world, but we 
can feel peace. We see the inequi-
ties of life, but we don’t have to 
feel overwhelmed. We can know 
that doing our part is enough, 
wherever we are and whatever 
our tasks. Also know that failure 
is part of success. It builds grit. 
Failure does not have to define 
you, but it will refine you.
n o t e s
1 Matthew 25:35.
2 Psalm 46:10.
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The Clark Memorandum welcomes the submission of short essays and anecdotes from its 
readers. Send your article (650 words or fewer) for “Life in the Law” to wisej@law.byu.edu.
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April4 General Conference Reception | Joseph SmithMemorial Building, 10th Floor | Salt Lake City | Noon
June 12–19 Alumni and Friends cle at Sea Alaska Cruise | Celebrity Solstice
July 29–August 1 Utah State Bar Convention and byu Law Reception | Sun Valley, Idaho 
August 17–21 J. Reuben Clark Law Society byu Education Week Attorney cle | byu
August 21 Alumni Welcome Breakfast | byu
August 26 Founders Day Dinner | Little America Hotel | Salt Lake City | 6:00 p.m.
August 27 byu LawAlumni GolfTournament | Thanksgiving Point | Lehi, Utah | 8:00 a.m.
r e u n i o n  w e e k e n d  |  b y u  
September 11 Alumni and Friends Ethics cle | byu
byu LawAlumni Class Reunion Dinners | 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010
September 12 byu Law Alumni and Friends Tailgate Party | byu Law SchoolWest Patio
October 1–2 J. Reuben Clark Law Society Leadership Conference | byu and Aspen Grove
October 3 General Conference Reception | Joseph SmithMemorial Building, 10th Floor | Salt Lake City | Noon
October 8 Speed Networking Lunchwith Students | Provo
January tba J. Reuben Clark Law Society Annual Fireside | Conference Center Little Theater | Salt Lake City | 6:00 p.m.
February tba J. Reuben Clark Law Society Annual Conference | Location tba
April4 General Conference Reception | Joseph SmithMemorial Building, 10th Floor | Salt Lake City | Noon
May 28–31 Washington Weekend | Supreme Court Swearing In
Formore information visit lawalumni.byu.edu or jrcls.org.
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